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NEUTRAL DISCRIMINATION—SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
OF RELIGIOUSLY NEUTRAL LAWS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly1 
(decided March 21, 2001) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects, among other things, the Free Exercise of Religion.2  Since its 
establishment, the Free Exercise Clause has been interpreted, scruti-
nized, and altered in its application.3  Courts have found that the 
strictest form of analytical scrutiny is to be applied to a government 
ordinance, law, or rule, which is neutral on its face but is not applied 
neutrally, and consequentially interferes with the free exercise of a 
religious group’s practice.4  This method of examining the Free Exer-
cise Clause is consistent with the text of the amendment, and is, 
therefore, acceptable to protect religious groups from laws that, while 
facially neutral, are enforced in a discriminatory manner.5 
 
1 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”). 
3 While certain aspects of the current and historical interpretations of the Free Exercise 
Clause will be discussed in this article, the long history of its analysis and enforcement is 
beyond this article’s scope.  For more information, see Frederick Mark Gedicks, On The 
Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief In: The United 
States, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2005), and Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise 
Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55 (2006). 
4 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 543 
(1993) (noting if the application of a law is not neutrally applied to religious and secular 
conduct, then the law is in violation of the Free Exercise Clause unless it serves a compelling 
state interest accomplished by means narrowly tailored to that interest). 
5 See, e.g., Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 144. 
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Through a plain language analysis, regardless of what level of 
constitutional scrutiny is appropriate, a law that clearly interferes 
with the free exercise of religion would be deemed unconstitutional 
on its face.6  Does that make religious discrimination impossible?  
No—it just adds a requirement of creativity.  A law does not need to 
have been created to discriminate, but if such a law is not being en-
forced neutrally, it can be construed to have a discriminatory effect.7  
This article focuses on tackling that issue, and it traces the Third Cir-
cuit’s decision in Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly,8 
using the case as a road map to identify and illustrate how a law or 
ordinance is scrutinized when it is facially neutral but violates the 
Free Exercise Clause in its application. 
II. BACKGROUND 
To properly analyze this method of interpreting the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, it is necessary to summarize the events in the Tenafly 
decision, as well as give a brief historical roadmap as to the prevail-
ing law surrounding First Amendment interpretation. 
A. Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly—
What Happened? 
The dispute in Tenafly arose when the Tenafly Borough gov-
ernment (the “Borough”) ordered the removal of lechi, which were 
posted on utility poles that created an eruv.9  This eruv allowed Or-
thodox Jewish citizens to freely move between their homes and the 
Synagogue on the Sabbath and holidays.10  Normally, pushing carts, 
such as baby carriages, without the eruv would have been in violation 
 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 153. 
8 309 F.3d 144. 
9 Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2001). 
An eruv, under Jewish law, is an unbroken physical delineation of an ar-
ea.  In tangible terms, it is a defined area created from either natural bar-
riers or artificial means, such as from wires strung across poles.  The 
boundaries of the eruv must resemble a series of doorways.  In this case, 
the eruv consists of existing horizontal wires and vertical black rubber 
coated castings, known as “lechis,” which serve as the sides of the sym-
bolic “doorway.” 
Id. at 146. 
10 Id. 
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of traditional Jewish Law, thereby forcing Orthodox Jewish parents 
to stay at home on holy days.11  There was an ordinance in the Bor-
ough of Tenafly that stated: “No person shall place any sign or adver-
tisement, or other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or 
elsewhere, in any public street or public place, excepting such as may 
be authorized by this or any other ordinance of the Borough.”12  Or-
dinance 691 was not brought to the attention of either the Borough or 
the Tenafly Eruv Association (the “Association”), but, nonetheless, 
the lechi used to create the eruv were ordered to be taken down.13 
After several meetings between the Association and the Bor-
ough, the Borough’s chairman finally pointed out that there was, in 
fact, a local ordinance that would support their decision to remove the 
lechi.14  The ordinance had been in place for quite some time, but it 
had not been enforced against house numbers, lost dog signs, and a 
number of other objects commonly posted on local utility poles.15  
With the ordinance as its backing power, the Borough quickly or-
dered the removal of all of the lechi; the Association sought an im-
mediate injunction to stop the removal based on claims that the ordi-
nance was in violation of the Jewish community’s First Amendment 
rights.16  The Association alleged both freedom of speech and Free 
Exercise violations, as well as a violation of the Fair Housing Act.17  
The trial court held that the Association would not prevail on its First 
Amendment or Fair Housing claims and, therefore, no injunction 
would be granted; the Association appealed.18 
B. Interpreting the Free Exercise Clause Historically 
It has been well established that in order for the government 
to impose any restriction on the free exercise of religion, that re-
striction must survive a heightened scrutiny analysis—there must be 
a compelling government interest being served by the restriction, and 
it must be accomplished by narrowly tailored means.19  However, the 
 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 159-60 n.15.  TENAFLY, N.J., ORDINANCE 691 art. VII (7) (1954). 
13 Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60. 
14 Id. at 168-69. 
15 Id. at 169. 
16 Id. at 170-71. 
17 Id. at 145. 
18 Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 191. 
19 To survive strict scrutiny, the law in question must serve a compelling government in-
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level of scrutiny applicable, and when it should apply, has undergone 
changes over recent years. 
1. Smith and the Laws that Followed 
A Free Exercise claim is either subject to a rational basis or 
strict scrutiny review, depending on the particular facts of the case.20  
The most prominent case that created such a distinction was Em-
ployment Division v. Smith.21  In Smith, the Supreme Court was asked 
to rule on whether a state that had laws forbidding the smoking of 
peyote was required to make an exception for Native Americans who 
used the substance during religious rituals.22  The Court held that the 
state was not required to make such an exception.23  Smith established 
that when a law is neutral on its face, but in its general application it 
burdens the free exercise of religion, the government need only show 
a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest for the law to sur-
vive scrutiny.24 
The holding in Smith essentially limited Free Exercise rights 
for any religious group that had traditional practices interfered with 
because of laws that only incidentally affected the religion.25  This 
decision garnered enough criticism that Congress passed a law to ef-
fectively negate it—the Religious Freedoms Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”) of 1993.26  RFRA stated that the act was to “restore the 
compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its application in all cases 
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened,”27 thus, 
plainly negating the holding in Smith.28  Four years later, the Supreme 
Court undermined RFRA significantly through its decision in City of 
 
terest and be accomplished by narrowly tailored means.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398, 406 (1963) (“[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state in-
terest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest abuses, en-
dangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ ”) (internal quota-
tions omitted). 
20 See, e.g., Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 165. 
21 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
22 Id. at 874. 
23 Id. at 882. 
24 Id. at 890. 
25 Id. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
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Boerne v. Flores,29 where it held that RFRA only applied to federal 
laws, not the individual states, thus, leaving state laws and ordinances 
at the mercy of the decision in Smith.30 
With RFRA legally neutered in matters of state law, Congress 
eventually passed the Protection of Religious Exercises in Land Use 
and by Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) in 2000.31  The 
terms in RLUIPA are virtually identical to those in RFRA, though it 
is more focused on land use regulations.32  Because this law has yet 
to be addressed by the Supreme Court as RFRA was, and therefore, 
still applies to both Federal and State laws, in matters not involving 
land use regulations the Supreme Court decisions still control.33 
2. Lukumi and the Other Half 
As stated above, the Supreme Court has determined that a ra-
tional basis scrutiny applies when a law is neutral and generally ap-
plicable, yet incidentally burdens the free exercise of religion.34  A 
year after Smith, the Court addressed the other half of that issue—
laws and ordinances are that not neutral, or not generally applicable, 
and how those laws are to be scrutinized—in Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Ave. Inc. v. City of Hialeah.35 
In Lukumi, the plaintiffs complained that a city rule that for-
bade the “unnecessary” killing of animals was not being uniformly 
enforced.36  Animal slaughter, as part of the Santeria religion’s prac-
tices, was considered illegal, but the city allowed hunting of the same 
types of animals for sport and for food.37  The Supreme Court stated 
the ordinance applied in such a way that it “devalue[d] religious rea-
sons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreli-
gious reasons.”38  Therefore, to justify a law that is facially neutral 
 
29 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
30 Id. 
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000). 
32 Id.  For more on RLUIPA and the battle between Congress and the Supreme Court over 
the Free Exercise clause, see Sara Smolik, The Utility and Efficacy of the RLUIPA: Was It a 
Waste?, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 723 (2004). 
33 See Smolik, supra note 32, at 743. 
34 Smith, 484 U.S. at 879. 
35 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993). 
36 Id. at 527. 
37 Id. at 537 (noting the ritual animal killings were for both food and religious ritual pur-
poses). 
38 Id. at 537-38. 
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but is not applied neutrally and where the selective enforcement is re-
ligiously motivated, the government must show there is a compelling 
state interest that is being accomplished by narrowly tailored 
means.39  The Supreme Court, between Smith and Lukumi, had, there-
fore, created a rule stating that rational basis scrutiny applied when a 
law was written and applied neutrally towards secular and religious 
groups, and there was an incidental infringement on the free exercise 
of religion, but if that infringement was not incidental, or the law was 
not facially neutral, strict scrutiny applied, and the law will likely be 
struck down as unconstitutional.40 
III. ANALYSIS 
As previously stated, the court will apply strict scrutiny when 
it comes to free exercise questions when the law is not neutral or 
generally applicable.41  The court in Tenafly used that criteria and ap-
plied strict scrutiny to the village ordinance but also outlined another 
circumstance where strict scrutiny would apply—a hybrid rights sce-
nario.42 
A. Hybrid Rights 
The court in Tenafly stated that strict scrutiny should be ap-
plied to laws, rules, and ordinances that are generally applicable and 
neutral but burden Free Exercise rights along with another constitu-
tional protections.43  There was an issue regarding freedom of speech 
that was addressed in the Tenafly case, and although that issue was 
disposed of, both the Free Exercise of Religion and another constitu-
tional protection were burdened, thus triggering a hybrid rights 
claim.44  However, because the plaintiffs did not raise such a claim, 
and the court had already determined that the Tenafly Borough Ordi-
nance was not universally applied, it was only noted that such a claim 
existed and could have been raised, but it was not analyzed further.45 
 
39 Id. at 546. 
40 See generally Smith, 484 U.S. 872; Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520. 
41 Smith, 484 U.S. at 879. 
42 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 165 n.26. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 165. 
45 Id. at 165 n.26. 
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B. The Tenafly Application 
The Borough Ordinance that gave rise to this claim was neu-
tral on its face; however, the court found that it was not being neutral-
ly applied; therefore, the plaintiffs’ claim did not immediately fail.46  
The court stated that the “lack of neutrality eviscerates [the] conten-
tion that [a] restriction is narrowly tailored to advance [a] compelling 
interest.”47  The Borough contended that the law was in fact neutral in 
its application and that the religious aspect of the eruv created an Es-
tablishment Clause48 issue, the avoidance of which would be a com-
pelling government interest.49 
First, the court did away with the Borough’s contention that 
the law was neutral because other violations of the ordinance that 
were not religious in nature and were allowed to remain were not 
permanent posts to the utility poles, as the lechi would be.50  The 
Borough had allowed other permanent attachments, such as house 
numbers, thus, the court was unconvinced by that argument, and it 
maintained that strict scrutiny would be applied.51 
In an attempt to show that, under strict scrutiny, the Borough 
had a legitimate, compelling interest in removing the eruv, it stated 
that allowing the lechi to stay in violation of the ordinance would 
create an Establishment Clause issue.52  The Borough contended, cor-
rectly, that it had a legitimate interest in avoiding the appearance that 
the town was supporting the Orthodox Jewish Religion.53  In its anal-
ysis, the court relied primarily on the Endorsement Test, which was 
established by Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Lynch 
v. Donnelly,54 for examining Establishment Clause issues.  The test 
asks, “would a reasonable, informed observer, i.e., one familiar with 
the history and context of private individuals’ access to the public 
money or property at issue, perceive the challenged government ac-
 
46 Id. at 167. 
47 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 172 (citing Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546-47). 
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion . . . .”). 
49 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 172. 
50 Id. at 167. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 172. 
53 Id. 
54 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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tion as endorsing religion?”55  Ultimately, the court held that a rea-
sonable, informed observer would not view the Borough as endorsing 
the Orthodox Jewish religion if it allowed the eruv to remain.56 
When religion is treated neutrally, it is typically held that a 
reasonable, informed observer would not see that a government body 
is endorsing religion.57  Furthermore, while emphasizing neutrality, 
the Supreme Court has allowed the government to “accommodate re-
ligious needs by alleviating special burdens.”58  It is important to dif-
ferentiate between religiously motivated conduct by private individu-
als, and conduct initiated or sponsored by the government.59  
Following this principle, the court in Tenafly stated, “[n]o reasonable, 
informed observer would perceive the decision of the plaintiffs to af-
fix lechis to utility poles owned by Verizon and to do so with Ca-
blevision’s assistance as ‘a choice attributable to the State.’ ”60 
Finally, the court went on to state that a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause required treatment of religion that is not neutral.61  
Furthermore, it would be an extremely unusual case where complying 
with free exercise principals could create an Establishment Clause 
violation.62  “The Religion Clauses prohibit the government from fa-
voring religion, but they provide no warrant for discriminating 
against religion.”63  Thus, the court determined that the Borough 
lacked a sufficient Establishment Clause claim, and without one, it 
would not be able to show a compelling state interest being accom-
plished by narrowly tailored means.64  Without such, the ordinance 
failed strict scrutiny, and the Tenafly Eruv Association prevailed.65 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The appellate court in Tenafly managed to correct the lower 
 
55 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 174; see, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 654-55 
(2002). 
56 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 177. 
57 Id. at 174-75. 
58 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994). 
59 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 177. 
60 Id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000)). 
61 Id. at 177-78. 
62 Id. 
63 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 717 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
64 Tenafly, 309 F.3d at 178. 
65 Id. 
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court’s apparent misstep.66  The Free Exercise Clause, by its own 
language, clearly intends to protect citizens and allow them to freely 
practice their chosen religion.  If a law is neutral towards religion but 
is being enforced in a way that prevents people from practicing their 
chosen faith, it should not stand.  Strict scrutiny is the proper lens to 
aim and shoot down these discriminatory practices.  It follows that a 
neutral law that is enforced in a manner that discriminates against re-
ligion could not reasonably be seen as existing to prevent an Estab-
lishment Clause problem.  Creative religious discrimination can, and 
was, combatted by rather straight forward principles—if a neutral law 
is enforced only against a religious group, that law will not survive. 
Jeffrey Gautsche

 
 
 
66 Id. 
* J.D. Candidate 2015, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; State University of 
New York at Albany, B.A. in English (2005). 
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